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I am an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University.
I am interested in meaning, uncertainty, agency, modality, collective attitudes, the open future, explanation, chance, mathematics, decisions, rationality and more (but I can’t write on everything in that list).
I did my PhD at UC Berkeley, on the Philosophy side of the program in Logic & Methodology of Science.
Before that I was an undergraduate at the University of Bologna. I grew up in Rome.
[I am still tinkering with some aspects of the site! I noticed that it doesn't work equally well with all browsers (by the way: if the buttons on the left don't work, you can still scroll down to view the other pages. If you are finding problems, please do e-mail me!].
publications
[These are my published or forthcoming articles. Where possible, I link to both the penultimate version and to the journal version. If citing, please check the latter.]
Refereed Articles
1. Ought and Resolution Semantics, forthcoming in Noûs.
I motivate and characterize an intensional semantics for ‘ought’ on which it does not behave as a universal quantifier over possibilities. Supersedes my older paper ‘Ought’ is not a box.
2. Judgment Aggregation, in Philosophy Compass, 6(1), pp.22-32, 2011
A gentle introduction to judgment aggregation, focusing on some epistemological applications.
3. Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation (with Marc Pauly and Josh Snyder) in Synthese, 163, pp.1-24, 2008.
We formalize a notion of language invariance for aggregation rules and investigate how it constrains the space of possible aggregation rules/ Reprinted in Philosopher’s Annual 2008.
Symposia & Book Reviews
1. Epistemology in Group Agency: 6 Objections in Search of the Truth, forthcoming in Episteme in a symposium on List and Pettit’s Group Agency.
2. Review of Francois Recanati’s Truth-Conditional Pragmatics forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly.
drafts
1. Deliberative Modality Under Epistemic Uncertainty (with M. Schwager and S. Kaufmann)
Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane have proposed revisions to the semantics and logic of ‘ought’ and ‘if’. We show that, if we are willing to be contrastivists about ‘ought’, we can retrieve all the required semantic verdicts with a more explanatory and somewhat more conservative theory.
2.Collective Reasons Via Judgment Aggregation
Critical discussion of accounts of collective reasons in the Judgment Aggregation literature. Motivates and develops the framework that underlies Aggregation Rules and Epistemic Norms
3. Aggregation Rules and Epistemic Norms
In order to model deference to a group of experts, it is not enough to know their opinions. You also need to know their reasons.
4. Mathematical Induction and Explanatory Value in Mathematics
The question whether mathematical inductions are explanatory does not admit of a uniform answer. Arguments to the contrary are flawed. (Paper still in early production stages).
